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The paper outlines the challenges for entry into EMU set up by Germany and the
extent to which potential members accepted these challenges. Three groups of
countries are identified: the core group (D-mark zone), the outsider group (countries
not willing to participate), and the convergence group (formerly) unstable countries
willing to participate). It is especially the progress towards convergence made by the
convergence group and the non-compliance of most countries with the fiscal criteria
which leads to uncertainty for the future path of European monetary integration: there
is still no consensus on the interpretation of the convergence criteria. Additionally,
there is another - maybe even more important - challenge for European monetary
integration: the lack of a consensus about the blueprint for economic policy making in
an European currency area - centralized versus decentralized, active versus passive
monetary and exchange rate policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION*
The decision to speed up European monetary integration taken in Maastricht in
December 1991 was primarily a political decision and came as a surprise to most
economists. Certainly, the agreement on the conditions and the timetable for the
transition from the European Monetary System (EMS) to an European Monetary
Union (EMU) followed a period of exchange rate stability (Collignon 19.94: .37-
38). This period from 1987.to 1990 which is sometimes called 'hard; EMS' was
characterized by a narrowing of exchange rate bands to +/- 2.25 percent for the
old members and the inclusion of new members (Spain (1989), United Kingdom
(1990), Portugal (1992)) with a larger band of +/- 6 percent around the official
ECU parity. But the discussion among economists was centered around the
question whether or not the EU is an optimal currency area. The consensus that,
if at all, this is the case only for a core group of countries was based on the
reasoning that the elimination of the exchange rates has economic costs in terms
of delayed real adjustment to changes in the economic environment differing
between individual countries (Bean 1992: 33-38).
Interestingly, it was the real shock of German unification which made the
Maastricht decision possible after all: the strategy of Germany to weaken political
resistance against unification by fostering the process of European integration.
Yet, Germany was prepared to surrender monetary sovereignty only under its
own terms, i.e. a maximum of certainty on monetary stability in EMU. This
political background explains why the conditions for EMU laid down in the
A former version of the paper has been contributed to a seminar on European Monetary
Union convened by the Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA) and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in Barcelona, March 1997.Maastricht Treaty are more about reducing the risk that the new European
currency will become less stable compared to the D-mark rather than about
reducing the costs of a common currency. It reflects the position of Germany to
;
limit costs of losing one of its countries most valuable assets, i.e. its currency.
The paper outlines the challenges for entry into EMU set up by Germany and the
extent to which potential members accepted these challenges. Chapter II will dis-
cuss how the German strategy to define a low-risk scenario for EMU resulted in
the definition of convergence criteria and in the design of an independent Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECJB). While these two aspects have already been included
in
1 the'Maastricht Treaty, another one was added recently:'the Stability Pact.
Chapter III will then deal with the costs of a common currency. In an economic
sense, possible costs are related to the concept of policy making in a monetary
union. Given the fact that intra-union exchange rates will be fixed, there are basi-
cally only two policy instruments left for real adjustment: fiscal and labor market
policy. In a political sense, EU countries have different positions and different
strategies during the transition process which will lead to a different perception of
the costs of becoming members of EMU. Based on the discussion of risks and
costs, Chapter IV outlines transition scenarios with respect to membership and
technical problems. Chapter V summarizes the results of the paper..
II. PRECONDITIONS FOR EMU
1. The Convergence Criteria
The Maastricht Treaty maps out conditions and a timetable for the transition to
monetary union (EMI 1996b). Four criteria have to be fulfilled on a sustainable
basis for admitting a country to EMU (Article 109j):1. A consumer price inflation rate no more than 1.5 percentage points above the
average for the (at most) three countries with the lowest inflation rates;
2. Average nominal long-term interest rates no more than 2 percentage points
above those for the (at most) three countries with the lowest inflation rates;
3. Participation in the EMS under normal bands and no exchange rate
realignments for at least two years;
4. A sustainable government financial position, defined as a general government
deficit to GDP ratio no more than 3 percent and a gross debt to GDP ratio no
more than 60 percent (with exceptions if an "excessive" deficit is temporary, or
an "excessive" deficit and /or debt ratio is declining at a "satisfactory" pace).
The purpose of these criteria
1 is to prevent the union being destabilized by the
premature admission of a country whose economic fundamentals are not yet
compatible with a fixed exchange rate (Bean 1992: 44-45). Obviously, a central
requirement then is that trend inflation rates are the same. The first three criteria
are intended to ensure this, criterion 1 covering the recent past while rules 2 and 3
are intended to be more forward looking in nature. While the long-term interest
rates are positively correlated with inflationary expectations, a recent devaluation
can be expected to increase inflationary pressure in the near future.
Whether these criteria are sufficient is debatable, since convergence in long-term
interest rates may simply reflect the credibility of the intention to move to
monetary union, and therefore to lock future short-term interest rates in different
countries even more closely together. Furthermore, even if inflation rates may
have converged, the real exchange rate could still be some way from sustainable
1 The Maastricht Treaty also has a fifth criterion which, however, is largely neglected in the
discussion. Convergence should also be measured by the balance-of-payments situation, the
integration of markets, unit-labor costs, and other price indices (real convergence).levels. The criteria are also debatable because they will immediately lose their
importance with the introduction of a new currency and because the irreversible
fixing : of .the exchange rate against a stable anchor currency can be a highly
efficient stabilization program (DeGrauwe 1994: 148-156). If this is the case, ex-
ante stabilization as required by the Maastricht criteria has economic costs for
high inflation countries.
Criterion 4, which is not a convergence criterion in the strict sense, is different to
the extent that fiscal variables will matter also after monetary unification. The in-
tention during the transition phase is to ensure that no country joins the monetary
union when its public finances are in such a state that they might destabilize the
monetary union. The general idea is that highly indebted member states may try
to reduce the real debt burden by striving for a monetary policy in EMU which
produces higher than expected inflation rates. For two reasons, criterion 4 is most
hotly debated. First, it is the criterion which provides the largest room for inter-
pretation. While there is now a consensus that with respect to criteria 1 and 2, the
averages of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates should be used to
calculate a reference rate and that participation in the EMS is easy to observe, the
terms "excessive" and "satisfactory" are flawed by lack of a quantitative defini-
tion. Second, the so-called fiscal criteria are the ones which are likely to be
missed by most countries.
Figures" 1 to 4 show the process of convergence with respect to the inflation,
interest rate and fiscal criteria from 1991 to 1996; Table 1 summarizes the results
from the official convergence report from the European Monetary Institute (EMI
1996b updated with data from the annual report EMI 1997) based on data avail-
able up to September 1996 as well as the forecasts from the European Commis-


























































































Source: EMI 1996b; 1997; EC 1996; OECD 1996; own calculations.utmost importance because of the timetable for monetary unification. After the
first possibility to start EMU was missed because the European Council of Heads
of States or Government (henceforth: European Council) decided in 1996 that no
majority of EU members has fulfilled the criteria, monetary union will start on
January 1,1999, with whatever states are eligible for membership. Therefore, the
European Council has to take its final decision in early 1998 and the EMI will
prepare the final convergence report based on actual data for 1997 at the
beginning of 1998:
2 It is also of importance to include two sources for the
forecasts because of political considerations. The EC is not neutral in the process
but can be expected to have a pro-EMU position due to the fact of being an EU
organization. In contrast, the OECD explicitly claims to be neutral with respect to
European monetary integration.
3
Tables 1 to 4 show that convergence measured by the individual criteria has been
quite different since Maastricht. The inflation criterion is the one revealing the
most clear cut trend towards convergence: the average for all ,15 EU members
(EU15) decreased constantly from 5.6 percent in 1991 to 2.4 percent in 1996.
The most dramatic reductions in inflation rates can be observed with respect to
the countries with the initially highest inflation rates (Greece, Portugal, Sweden,
and the UK) and in Finland which became the country with the lowest inflation
rate by 1996.
The picture for long-term interest rates is similar to the one for inflation rates
concerning the general trend for lower interest rates. However, it differs in two
2 There will also be a report prepared by the EC. Both reports will be evaluated by the
European Council of Ministers of Economics and Finance which, in turn, will forward a
recommendation to the European Council of Heads of States or Government.
3 For the reason of non-comparability, the latest forecasts of the EC are not considered in
Table 1 but mentioned throughout the text in the case that they differ from the results
shown in the table.respects. First, neglecting Portugal and Greece (not reported in Figure 2) which
made the most pronounced progress towards lower long-term interest rates, the
difference between the country with the highest rates (Italy) and the lowest rates
(Luxembourg) hardly changed between 1991 and 1996. Second, the reduction of
interest rates consistent with declining inflation rates was temporarily reversed
during the years of the EMS crisis (except for Luxembourg).
The exchange rate crisis started with the devaluation of the Italian lira at
September 14, 1992 and led to subsequent devaluations for the lira, the Spanish
peseta, the Portuguese escudo, and the Irish punt as well as the demission of the
lira and the British pound from the EMS and the abandonment of the ECU peg of
Sweden and Finland. Finally, in order to prevent a devaluation of the French
franc, the fluctuation bands were widened from 2.25 percent on either side of
central parities to 15 percent in August 2, 1993. Obviously, the exchange rate
crisis increased real interest rates until devaluation expectations were reduced by
nominal devaluations. Since March 1995 when the Spanish peseta and the
Portuguese escudo have been devalued, no changes in parities have taken place
and exchange rate fluctuations calmed down. Consequently, long-term interest
rates started to decline again in 1996 and Italy and Finland entered the EMS on
the still generous terms of a 30 percent fluctuation band.
As a reflection of these facts, Table 1 reports that the state of and the
perspectives for convergence with respect to the inflation and interest rate criteria
are appropriate. Following the EMI convergence report, only Greece, Spain,
Italy, Portugal, and the UK fail to meet at least one of both criteria. For 1997,
both the EC and the OECD expect only Greece to report to high inflation and
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Figure 4— Public Debt in the 15 EU Member States, 1991-1996 (percent of GDP)








1993 1994 1995 1996
Dancmark Greece
—a— France —*— Irland
—B—Luxembourg —-o— Netherlands
—•— Portugal n Finland
'• UK
Germany • EUR15
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the exchange rate criterion because these three countries still do not participate in
the EMS.
4
Contrary to progress on the inflation and exchange rate front, fiscal indicators did
not show a clear trend towards fulfilling the criteria. Figure 3 shows that fiscal
balances rather deteriorated until 1993. Obviously, the EMS crisis led to a new
policy scenario. Three explanations are at hand. First, the long period of absence
of an exchange rate crisis in the EMS may have led to an attitude of looking at the
agreement on building a monetary union as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, the
countries with an initial deficit less than 3 percent may have thought that higher
deficits would help to end the recession soon and would be easy to reduce
afterwards. Third, countries with a high level of indebtedness may have thought
that the criteria would not be interpreted in a strict sense if most countries would
fail to meet them. None of these expectations has materialized and the trend
towards higher fiscal deficits has been reversed since 1994 when it turned out that
the anchor currency country Germany insisted on taking the fiscal deficit criteria
very seriously. The most prominent examples of this general trend are Sweden
and Greece. The most prominent exceptions being Luxembourg and Ireland with
a permanent surplus, Germany which showed increasing fluctuations around the 3
percent_rate, and Italy which permanently reduced the deficit starting from a very
high level.
According to the Treaty, EMS participation under "normal conditions" is required for the
last two years before the decision on EMU is taken. Therefore, the entry of Italy and
Finland into the EMS in late 1996 would have been too late. However, the political
reactions to these events seem to indicate that the exchange rate criterion will be
interpreted in the sense that participation with wide bands and for two years before the start
of EMU may be sufficient to fulfill the criterion.13 Bibiiothek des Instituis
fur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
The comparison between Figures 3 and 4 reveals that lowering fiscal deficits has
not been large enough to achieve a lower level of public indebtedness. Italy
exemplifies the lagged impact of an improvement in the current fiscal situation on
the level of indebtedness. While the deficit decreased from 10.2 in 1991 to 6.6
percent of GDP in 1996, indebtedness increased from 101.4 to 123.4 percent of
GDP. Only if the primary fiscal surplus (fiscal balance before interest payments)
is sufficient to reduce the debt stock significantly and the interest burden
decreases, fiscal consolidation can gain pace. This is demonstrated by the cases
of Denmark and Ireland. These two countries have already been marked as cases
of sufficient adjustment by both the EC and the EMI which means that although
public debt is significantly above 60 percent of GDP the reduction of the debt
ratio shows a sustainable convergence towards the reference rate.
Table 1 also reflects the rather slow progress of convergence with respect to the
fiscal criteria. Only Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg are likely to fulfill both
criteria in 1997. According to EC projections France could be added to the list
and Germany and Spain would at least fulfill the deficit criterion. However, the
figures for the 1997 deficits of 2.9 and 3.0 percent respectively give the
impression that these estimates contain at least some wishful thinking.
5 It has also
to be considered that more and more countries switch to the art of "creative"
bookkeeping: France counts a one-time transfer of cash from France Telecom to
the government (0.5 percent of GDP), in exchange for the company's pension
liabilities to be covered by the slate, Italy collects an "euro tax" (0.6 percent of
GDP), which is to be partially refunded in future years, and Austria privatizes
public debt by shifting it to quasi-fiscal budgets (about 4.5 percent of GDP
5 The latest EC projections are even more optimistic: the UK is expected to keep its deficit
below 3 percent (2.9); Finland is expected to reduce its indebtedness to a ratio below 60
percent of GDP (59.2). Moreover, Finland together with the Netherlands are proposed to
be skipped from the list of countries with excessive deficits (Europe, No. 6961 (N.S.)).14
according to opposition parties). At the same time, other countries like Portugal,
Spain and Belgium resort to the short-term measure of privatizing public assets
(Focus 25/11/96; the Economist 30/11/96). To sum up, only Luxembourg fulfills
the criteria without any doubt, while Denmark and Ireland fulfill the criteria only
due to sufficient adjustment. All other countries miss at least one precondition for
EMU membership.
2. The European Central Bank (ECB)
The ECB will be at the heart of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
consisting of the ECB and the National Central Banks (NCBs) (Gros and
Thygesen 1992: Chapter 13). Given the German preference for a low-risk
scenario, it would be no surprise if the Statutes of the ECB show strong
similarities to the Bundesbank (Buba). This is indeed the case (Willms 1992: 217-
221). However, the blueprint for the ECB also includes elements of the Federal
Reserve System (Fed) of the United States (Walter 1993::226-245). . •<:.. ,..
Similarities to the Buba concept show up when looking at the decision making
process, the implementation of monetary policy and the independence of the
bank. The decision making process takes place in a Council in both the ECB
(Governing Council) and the Buba (Bundesbankrat). These Councils consist of
the members of the Executive Board (Direktorium in the case of the Buba) and
the presidents of the.regional central banks, i.e. the NCBs in the case of the ECB
and the central banks of the German Lander (Landeszentralbanken). Each
member of the Council has one vote and decisions are taken by simple majority.
This seems to be quite similar to the construction of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). However, the decisive difference is that the FOMC consists
of 7 members of the Board of Governors and only 5 members from Federal
Reserve Banks. This implies that the FOMC is dominated by the Board of
Governors, whereas the Council of the ECB and the Buba are dominated by the15
members of the regional central banks (assuming that a majority of EU members
will participate in EMU).
In contrast, the implementation of monetary policy is highly decentralized in the
US because it falls into the responsibility of the Federal Reserve Banks. In both
the Buba and the ECB the Board is the main executive power. In Germany, the
Direktorium implements all open market and foreign exchange market operations
and leaves some discretion to the Landeszentralbanken only in the case of
measures which have an exclusively regional impact. In the ESCB, the
implementation of all measures of monetary policy falls into the responsibility of
the Executive Board.
The same relationship between the Fed, the Buba, and the ECB shows up when
analyzing the independence of the central bank. Members of the Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of the US, controlled by the Banking
Committee and by the Joint Economic Committee, and are obliged to target
monetary policy at achieving not only price stability but also full employment,
balance-of-payments equilibrium, and real growth. Additionally, the Fed has to
support the general economic policy of the government. The latter is also the case
for the ECB and the Buba, but only to the extent that the primary target, price
stability, is not in danger. The two central banks are also similar with respect to
financial and functional independence, i.e. they have own financial sources and
they are not controlled by parliament. Additionally, the personal independence of
the members of the Council is fairly guaranteed. In Germany, the appointment of
a new member of the Direktorium involves the government, the Council of the
Lander (Bundesrat) and the President of the Republic while the presidents of the
Landeszentralbanken are appointed by the respective Lander. In the case of the
ECB, the members of the Executive Board have to be appointed by the European
Council (unanimous vote) and the presidents of the NCBs are appointed by the16
respective countries according to their national procedure.
6 Additionally,
borrowing to the government is strictly prohibited for the ECB while they are
only restricted for the Buba and allowed for the Fed. All in all, the ECB will be
even more independent from political influences than the Buba presently is.
As was mentioned above, there are also some similarities between the ECB and
the Fed. One similarity is the legal independence of the regional central banks,
i.e. the Federal Reserve Banks and the NCBs. More important for practical
monetary policy, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed and the
President of the ECB have a quite strong position. They both represent the bank
and have the decisive vote in the Board and in the Council in the case of a
stalemate. .-....-
3. The Stability Pact
Although Germany convinced the other EU members to agree on rather
demanding convergence criteria, to design the ECB according to the Buba
blueprint, and to locale the monetary authority in Frankfort, discussions in
Germany about the stability of the new currency did not come to a halt but rather
swelled with time approaching the start of EMU. Finally, the German Council of
Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat) recommended the government to
convince the European partners that a stable European currency needs an
agreement on fiscal stability during EMU.
The main argumentation runs as follows (SVR 1995: 246-259). The fiscal criteria
for entry into the EMU are not sufficient because they only provide an incentive
for a consolidation of government finances in order to fulfill entry conditions
The terms of the members of the Executive Board is 8 years (they can not be rcelcclcd); the
other'members of the Governing Council should have a minimum term of 5 years. The
members of the Direktorium and Rat including the president of the Buba have a maximum
of 8 years (2 terms).17
while renewed fiscal expansion is unrestricted after entry into EMU. This creates
a problem for the stability of the common currency because market participants
anticipate monetary policy to become more expansive in order to lower the real
debt burden of highly indebted countries or even to bail them out. Although this
has been explicitly excluded in the Maastricht Treaty, the credibility of excluding
a bail-out is rated to be rather low. The intention of a Stability Pact is, therefore,
to penalize excessive deficits in order to discourage governments from becoming
expansionist. This should lead to an environment for the ECB which makes it
easier to conduct a stable monetary policy. .
However, this position is not undebated even within Germany. Critical arguments
are concerned about the need for such a regulation of fiscal policy making or fear
that the Pact may be even counterproductive (Schweickerl 1996: 198-204).
Generally, the regulation of fiscal policy is only necessary for a stable monetary
policy if some assumptions are fulfilled. First, it has to be assumed that monetary
policy actually can reduce the debt burden via a surprise inflation. But such a
surprise inflation can reduce real interest rates only in the short-run. It will at the
same time increase the cost of refinancing public debt by increasing long-term
interest rates and by shortening the term structure of public debt. This will make
it rather difficult for a highly indebted country to convince other EMU members
to share this burden. It is at least more difficult than for a national government to
urge upon a national central bank.
Second, the argument in favor of a Stability Pact also assumes that each member
of the Council of the ECB will represent her national preferences or the interests
of her national government. This is an important argument because it has always
been claimed by German politicians and economists that the independence of the
Buba leads to the effect that new members of the Council rather quickly cease to
represent the preferences of their respective supporting group and instead adopt18
the preferences of the institution. But even if one follows the argument and
assumes that members of the ECB Council will represent national preferences,
the decision making process makes it rather difficult for highly indebted countries
to
: influence monetary policy. This is because the six members of the Directorate
have to be appointed by unanimous vote from the European Council which makes
it rather likely that the members come from the more stability-minded countries.
Together with the six presidents of their national central banks they represent
twelve votes - the simple majority even with all EU members on board would be
eleven votes. This implies that the more stable countries can easily dominate the
decision making process. v
Third, the proponents of the Pact also have to assume that the capital markets can
not discriminate between borrowers with different credit standings and ,
therefore, can not force highly indebted countries to adjust early. However, it is to
be expected that the ability of the capital market to fulfill this task will improve
with currency unificatipn because this step will eliminate exchange rate risks and
improve capital mobility.
Finally, the Stability Pact could backfire because it makes explicit that there are
considerable doubts whether or not the ECB can follow a monetary policy
targeted at providing price stability in Europe. It therefore diminishes the
credibility of the central bank. It also increases the pressure on monetary policy to
achieve other targets like full employment if it effectively rules out the use of
fiscal policy to a considerable extent. Moreover, it is likely to deepen recessions
for countries with a deficit of close to 3 percent of GDP before recession. To
prevent the deficit rising above the ceiling, the government would need to cut
spending and raise taxes - aggravating the slowdown - or to pay a fine which
even increases the need to cut spending and to raise taxes.19
Notwithstanding these arguments, Germany proposed that governments failing to
keep their budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP would have to place a deposit
with the European authorities. If the excess borrowing continued, the funds would
be forfeit. Fines would be calculated at the rate of 0.2 percent of GDP plus
another 0.1 percent for every percentage point by which the deficit exceeded 3
percent of GDP, i.e. a deficit of 6 percent of GDP would have triggered the
maximum fine of 0.5 percent of GDP. Had such a pact been in force in 1996, the
fine for Germany itself would have been $ 7 billion. In the end, Germany climbed
down at the Dublin meeting in December 1996. The compromise named Stability
and Growth Pact defines automatic exceptions rather than automatic fines (see
Scheide and Solveen 1997a: 15-17). In case of an economic decline of less than
0.75 percent or economic growth the countries agreed that "as a rule" they will
keep the fiscal deficit below 3 percent of GDP, i.e. the rules for "excessive"
deficits (Art. 104c of the Maastricht Treaty) apply as before. In case of an
economic decline between 0.75 percent and 2 percent, countries can plead
"exceptional circumstances" in order to avoid a fine which may be as big as 0.5
percent of GDP. In practice this means that a procedure involving the EC and the
Council of Ministers containing six steps is set in motion which provides
considerable scope for political discretion. In case of an economic decline of
more than 2 percent of GDP, EMU members will be free to allow themselves
fiscal deficits above 3 percent of GDP, i.e. the provisions of Art. 104c do not
apply at all.
It is reasonable to assume that such a pact is unlikely to be effective in
constraining fiscal expansion but likely to undermine the credibility of the no-bail-
out clause of the Maastricht Treaty. The pact is also a valuable bargaining chip
for countries not fulfilling the public debt criterion. This is because the fiscal
deficit criterion of 3 percent of GDP has been designed to lead to an automatic
convergence of public debt levels towards the required 60 percent level20
(assuming an average growth of nominal GDP of 5 percent). Hence, with deficits
bound bejow 3 percent by the Stability and Growth Pact, public debt level will
converge anyway somewhat in the future.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF EMU
/. Economic Costs
Economists have never been sure about economic costs of monetary integration
which are related cither to the process of transition to a monetary union or to
running the monetary union itself (see DeGrauwe 1994: Chapter I). Some of the
possible costs related to transition have already been mentioned in Chapter II. In
order to be eligible for membership in EMU, potential members have to stabilize
prices and to consolidate government finances first. This needs restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies and it implies costs in terms of, at least temporarily,
higher unemployment if relative prices do not adjust immediately. While there is
little doubt about this fact, the problem is to relate these costs either to the sins of
the past or to the current problem of transition to EMU. As there is little doubt
about the costs of stabilization and consolidation, there is little doubt as well
about the positive effect of stable prices and a consolidated budget on economic
growth. Hence, countries with high inflation and high fiscal deficits would have
had to bear economic costs in the future irrespective of the monetary integration
process.
A different problem of transition stems from the fact that economic performance
and market expectations are interdependent. This means that interest rates on
public debt of the highly indebted countries were lower if there were no doubts
about their eligibility as member of the monetary union. Consequently, fiscal
consolidation and price stabilization would have been much easier. Basically, this
is the concept of an external anchor for domestic monetary policy and the idea to21
import credibility of a stable country. But this concept has an important caveat.
Announcements of stabilization and consolidation may not be time-consistent,; i.e.
once a country is eligible for membership in the monetary union there may be
 :no
incentive to further stick to preannounced policy reforms. In this sense, one may
look at the Maastricht criteria as a chance for countries in need for reform to
overcome the resistance of important pressure groups and to push reforms which
increase the growth perspectives of the country.
Once being a member of a monetary union, economic costs may arise due to the
fact that the exchange rate is no longer available as an efficient instrument for the
adjustment of investment and production to a changing economic environment.
However, the exchange rate is only an efficient instrument in this sense if (1) an
economic shock is country specific and if (2) there is some exchange rate illusion
to be exploited (Vaubel 1988; Bofinger 1994). The general validity of both
assumptions can be doubted. With further progress in European integration of
goods and factor markets, the patterns of production, consumption and
investment become less and less country specific which implies that shocks are
more likely to be either sector specific or affect a region rather than a country.
With further progress in European integration of goods and factor markets,
workers and employees should also have become more aware that a devaluation
of the exchange rate reduces real wages because it raises the price of traded
goods, a substantial component of the consumption basket. With less exchange
rate illusion, wages, the most important component of non-traded goods prices,
will react to devaluations thus neutralizing the effects on real wages and on the
real exchange rate, i.e. the relative price of traded goods to non-traded goods.
If these arguments are true at least to some extent, it again becomes difficult to
evaluate the costs of EMU. While the assumptions of country specific shocks
and exchange rate illusion lead to high costs, there may also be net benefits if the22
elimination of the exchange .rate instrument, enforces decentralized wage
bargaining structures. Clearly, if available this is the first best instrument from a
purely economic perspective. ,
Another source of cost related to EMU may be the independence of the ECB
which for most countries of the EU makes a significant difference to their national
arrangements where the central bank often is an integral part of the overall
demand management to smooth business cycles. To the contrary, the ECB is
expected to give priority to price stability irrespective of the state of the real
economy. Again, there are two possible interpretations to this situation. The
proponents of an active monetary and fiscal policy would argue that the
elimination of monetary policy as an instrument to influence the business cycle
puts more pressure on fiscal policy to fulfill this task. Hence, there is a need for a
centralized or at least harmonized European fiscal policy or a rather lax
interpretation of the ECB's target system. The proponents of a passive monetary
and fiscal policy would, of course, interpret the independence of the central bank
as an advantage because they do not believe in the possibility to smooth business
cycles by monetary policy or by a more active fiscal policy than implied by the
built-in stabilizers. More important as a task for fiscal policy is to provide a
policy package adequate to attract investment and to foster structural adjustment.
This, however, rather needs a strictly decentralized fiscal policy in order to allow
governments to compete, i.e. for institutional competition.
Generally, the debate can be reduced to an argument between two economic
concepts. While the adoption of an Keynesian view assumes exchange rate
illusion and leads to the support of an active use of exchange rate, monetary and
fiscal policy to guide real adjustment, the neo-classical view denying the
existence of exchange rate illusion gives first priority to wage adjustment as well
as decentralized structures for wage bargaining and fiscal policy decisions.2. Political Implications
An independent opinion poll in Europe's leading countries (United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and Italy) on the issue of European Integration revealed
significant differences in the perception of the consequences of a single currency
(Handelsblatt, Le Figaro, L'Espresso, The Daily Telegraph cited in Handelsblatt
10/1/97 - answers in percent).
• Support for the common currency
Italy: 71; France: 61; Germany: 43; United Kingdom: 26.
• Common currency has positive effects
Italy: 58; France: 53; Germany: 16; United Kingdom: 20.
A first interesting result is that the percentages of support are lowest for the
United Kingdom. While this is hardly surprising given the outsider position of the
country in the entire negotiation process, the results for the second question
shows that the support mainly stems from people thinking that the common
currency will have positive effects while this percentage is much lower in all
other countries. This result is consistent with the assumption that the British
calculus is mainly an economic one. People are only ready to forgo national
independence if there is a clearcut economic advantage in the offing. Sweden and
Denmark join the United Kingdom in this group of countries which may be
refered to as outsiders to the process of monetary integration. Hence, they do not
participate in the EMS and/or have an opt-out clause for participation in EMU.
They are also the strongest proponents of the concept of decentralized policy
making for the EU.
7
If not otherwise cited, information on the individual countries is due to series of articles in
the Handelsblatt (Wahrungcn im Eurotest) and Dcr Tagcsspiegel (Wer will den Euro'?).24
As a second result, Italians are most emphatic about the common currency. This
is hardly surprising because the country represents a group of countries which
may be labeled the convergence group, i.e. countries which initially have been far
from fulfilling the criteria for entry into EMU but have made substantial progress
during the recent years. Ireland^ Finland, Portugal, Spain, and to some extent even
Greece join Italy in this group of countries. These are the countries which expect
the highest net benefits from participating in EMU primarily because it
consolidates their stabilization efforts.
In the convergence group, Ireland and Portugal are clearly the star performers.
Especially Ireland was able to use the momentum created by the requirement to
fulfill the convergence criteria to foster stabilization and consolidation. A social
pact resulted in a low growth of wage costs and in the possibility to restructure
the fiscal budget. Consequently, Ireland became an example for fiscal restriction
creating economic growth, i.e. it has net benefits, even in the short-run provided
that a country implements an adequate reform package. Spain, Italy, and Greece
share a similar performance with respect to stabilization but have been unable to
translate this into strong and sustainable economic growth and a reduction of
unemployment.
Irrespective of their individual performance, all countries in the group have shown
a strict commitment to the process of monetary integration even when bearing
economic costs in terms of high interest rates and high unemployment - the most
extreme example in this respect is Spain. Except for Greece, they object attempts
by more stable countries to discuss scenarios of a core monetary union - the most
extreme example in this case is Italy.
This indicates that the motivations for these countries are also of a political
nature. To some extent they want to break with a traditionally strong dependence
from their neighbors in both economic and political terms. This is especially true25
for Ireland (versus the United Kingdom) and Portugal (versus Spain):
Additionally, there are purely political reasons for participating in European
integration on all levels like external security in the case of Finland and the
consolidation and safeguarding of the democratization process in the case of
Portugal and Spain.
The other two countries included in the opinion poll, France and Germany, clearly
belong to the core group, i.e. they will either participate or EMU will not come to
operation. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria also belong to
this group of countries which - together with Denmark - form the D-mark zone.
As can be seen from the results above, the perception of the monetary union
differs significantly between the two countries. Obviously, 27 percent of the
Germans support the common currency although they do not think that it will
have positive effects. But this positive engagement is not sufficient to yield a
majority for the Euro. This result basically reflects the fears on the part of
Germany that the French view of monetary policy will finally succeed
notwithstanding the Maastricht criteria, the independent ECB, and the Stability
PaCt.
 ! ...:.. !,.:•
Although there is no evidence there are some facts which feed such fears. France
has been able to occupy key positions in the monetary unification process - the
head of the European statistical office which has to approve controversial budget
measures and the commissioner for monetary affairs who is responsible for the
EC's convergence report. France is also the strongest proponent of an active
exchange rate and fiscal policy as well as of a strong influence of governments on
the decisions of the central bank (The Economist 21/12/96; FAZ 24/1/97). In this
respect, it launched an initiative to form a council for stability in which the
finance ministers should discuss the coordination of fiscal policy and the design
of the common exchange rate policy. Recently, this position also gained26
prominent support by the former president Giscard d'Estaing who argued in favor
of a devaluation of the franc and even the D-mark before entry into EMU in order
to regain competitive strength. Additionally, resistance against a restrictive fiscal
policy is strongest in France.
On the other hand, the French position is rather isolated when looking at the other
core countries. Fiscal consolidation in the Netherlands, in Belgium, and in Austria
has by now not provoked significant resistance and the Netherlands are among
the countries strongly supporting a strict interpretation of the convergence
criteria. Their main motivation is that they want to participate in designing and
implementing a monetary policy which they followed in the past and which they
are unwilling to change.
III. TRANSITION TO EMU
In a formal sense, the scenario for monetary unification is fairly fixed (EMI
1995):
• Phase I (- Dec. 98): Preparations for EMU including the decision by the
European Council on the membership and the establishment of the ESCB.
• Phase II (Jan. 99 - Dec. 2001): The ECB will start conducting its single
monetary policy in the European Currency, the Euro.
• Phase III (Jan. 2002 - June 2002): The ECB will start issuing Euro banknotes
and exchanging the national banknotes and coins against Euros.
• Phase IV (July 2002 - ): Monetary unification is complete with the Euro
banknotes becoming the sole legal tender in the European currency area.
This scenario requires a political decision on the membership as well as technical
and legal measures in order to implement EMU.27
/. Membership and Alternatives for Non-Members
Given the debates on the measures for reducing the risks related to the introduc-
tion of a so-called new currency and on the best design for economic policy in
order to reduce the costs of a common currency, it remains fairly unclear which
countries will join EMU in 1999 and which countries will have to wait either par-
ticipating in EMS II or staying completely outside the formal monetary inte-
gration process. In the end, the political decision has to be taken in 1998 by the
European Council with a qualified majority, i.e. with a minimum sum of votes of
62 out of 87. In order to develop some scenarios, Table 2 divides.the EU
members into three groups defined above: the core group, the convergence group,
and the outsider group. It also relates the votes of the country groups to their
fulfillment of the convergence criteria.
A first scenario may be described as the opt-out scenario. If Germany would try
to postpone EMU by arguing that a strict interpretation of the convergence cri-
teria is necessary this is likely to be successful. Based on EC projections 4
countries will comply with all criteria giving a sum of 18 votes only. Additionally,
:
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark may join this posi-
tion eitherbecause they are convinced by the argument or because they prefer to
delay the introduction of a strong European currency in their neighborhood. These
countries easily form a blocking minority of 32 votes, i.e. it would be impossible
for the other countries to go ahead without them.
Excluding both possibilities that Germany tries to opt-out and that all criteria have2 8
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Source: See Table 1; own calculations.29
to be fulfilled in a strict sense,
8 Italy is likely to play the decisive role. As shown
in Table 2, a qualified majority is possible if the two fiscal criteria are neglected.
Both the EC and the OECD estimated that the convergence group, with the
exception of Greece, will meet the other criteria. If the core group joins this group
this would account for sufficient votes to form a qualified majority.
However, if only the deficit criterion is added to the list of relevant criteria, Italy
is most likely to be out and to join the group of countries voting against a small
EMU. Even assuming that Germany, France, and Spain will meet the deficit
criterion, it will be difficult for political reasons to allow Spain and Portugal to
participate while Italy has to stay out. Hence, EMU would shrink to the core
group plus Ireland and Finland, a group of countries which would need the votes
of all outsiders plus Greece to go ahead.
Just some years ago, the idea to restrict entry into EMU by promising a later
entry, e.g. in
;2002 with the physical introduction of the new currency, was highly
plausible. But now the'progress of convergence outside the core group has
already reached a level which makes it more or less impossible to imagine a
scenario of a small EMU formed by the core group (see Scheide and Solveen
1997b: 5-6). In addition, the negotiations on the design of EMS II do not indicate
that such a scenario would be acceptable for countries like Italy, Spain, and
Portugal. The agreements in Dublin show that the new system will have rather
unattractive features for countries relying on the external anchor approach: the
bands will be wide, the obligations on the part of the ECB to intervene in favor of
EMS II currencies will be fairly restricted, and the interference of the ECB into
national exchange rate policy will be far-reaching. It is therefore plausible that
8 Even if the latest optimistic projections of the EC would become reality, the countries
passing all criteria would be Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland,
a group of countries which accounts for only 16 votes in the European Council and which
hardly constitutes reasonable currency area.especially the Southern European countries lose a substantial part of the
credibility they gained by the market perception of their likely entry into EMU.
Interest rates, debt service, and, hence, public deficits would rise. A rise of
interest rates, e.g., by 0.5 percentage points will imply an increase in Italy's fiscal
deficit of 0.6 percentage points. This would imply that entry in 2002 would be
harder to achieve than entry in 1999. Hence, the countries of the convergence
group will in all likelihood put up maximum political pressure for being taken in if
EMU starts.
Alternatives for non-participating countries are rare because any unilateral
narrowing of bands, e.g. to the former 2.25 percent deviation to either side, would
immediately invite speculative attacks. Therefore, the Currency Board or a
parallel currency seem to be the only alternatives at hand. In a currency board,
the monetary base in national currency has to be fully backed by foreign
exchange reserves, e.g. in Euro. Without the help of the ECB, this is difficult to
achieve. With a parallel currency approach the non-participating countries would
introduce the Euro as a legal tender perfectly substitutable to their national
currency. Given a more or less floating exchange rate, the market would then
decide on the portfolio held by the private sector.
2. Technical and Legal Aspects of Transition
Most technical and legal requirements for EMU have to be fulfilled already at the
end of Phase I. But the implementation of these measures will only gain speed
after the European Council will have decided on membership. However, the
general requirements have already been laid down. They are related to the supply
of the new currency (EMI 1995, EC 1995).
First, the instruments and the targets for monetary policy have to be defined. The
targets for monetary policy will be a mixture of both a money supply target and adirect inflation target. The EMI also already outlined a model for the conduct of a
European monetary policy (EMI 1996a). The main instruments will be a variety
of open market, policies which are complemented by lending and borrowing
facilities forming a corridor around market interest rates. Minimum reserves
requirements will be of minor importance. These: policies, have still to be
harmonized in order to exclude any possibilities for arbitrage due to institutional
differences. . . .-, ..,•::..
Second, the statutes of national central banks have to become compatible'with the
statutes of the ESCB. This requires their independence in the first place. Up to
now, only the Danish Central Bank passes this test and even the Bundesbank still
fails to meet all requirements of independence (EMI 1996b: Annex 1): the
government can postpone the implementation of the Bundesbankrat, the minimum
term for the members of the Council is less than 5 years, and the priority for
achieving price stability is not stated clearly. In addition to independence, NCBs
have to be ready to act as an agent of the ECB.
Third, public authorities have to provide a legal framework to be in place so as to
ensure the status of the Euro and its irrevocably fixed conversion rates against
national currencies. During Phase II and III the legal framework has to guarantee
the freedom to transact on either national or European monetary units. This
should allow the private sector to optimize an individual transition schemes.
Therefore, it is also to be guaranteed that in Phase II contracts in national
currency will be converted into contracts in Euro using the conversion rate, while
the contracts as such remain their full validity in law. The difficult question will
be how to translate this into a legal text so that it is binding for non-EMU and
even non-EU inhabitants.
 :
Fourth, the conversion rates have to be defined at the beginning of Phase II.
Hence, exchange rates will have to be locked at the start of 1999. Exactly howthey will be locked poses something of a dilemma (see Lehment and Scheide
1995 for a detailed discussion). If the authorities leave the fixing of rates until the
tost moment, speculation may cause a lot of exchange rate turbulence in the very
months or weeks before EMU starts. If instead the rates were announced in
advance, everything would depend on the credibility of Europe's monetary
authorities. If they retain the market's confidence, speculation could help pinning
exchange rates at the preannounced levels; if not, the preannounced parities might
be attacked just as the old EMS was - with similar results. The problem will
continue, and perhaps worsen, once exchange rates have been fixed
"irrevocably", at whatever parities, at the start of 1999. Suppose the French franc
is swapped for D-marks completely and the ECB will order marks and stop
francs to be issued. Would France and Germany go along with this? Any
suspicion that they will not would become self-fulfilling.
IV. SUMMARY
The main challenges for European monetary integration are easy to summarize:
r The lack of consensus on the interpretation of the convergence criteria - strict
versus lax.
• The lack of consensus about the blueprint for economic policy making in an
European currency area - centralized versus decentralized, active versus
passive monetary and exchange rate policy.
The interpretation of the convergence criteria will decide on the entry into the
European Monetary,,Union (EMU). The dilemma is that a small monetary union
including the countries which have been successful in forming a D-mark zone is
not likely to find a qualified majority in the European Council of Heads of Statesor Government in early 1998, while a large monetary union can win a majority of
votes but fails to meet the fiscal criteria. ,:
The interpretation of economic policy complementing the ECB's attempt towards
stabilizing a European price level will decide on the costs of the single currency.
From a purely economic point of view this would have been the more relevant
question to be discussed right from the start of the EMU project; From a political
point of view, this provides the set up for, a tough competition - at least in the
theatre of economic diplomacy (see Siebert 1997 for a discussion of policy
options).
However, there are not only, reasons, to. doubt a smooth transition to and a smooth
functioning of EMU. The Statutes of the European Central Bank (ECB) go well
beyond the already high standards set up by the US Federal Reserve.System and
the German Bundesbank in providing independence to the members of the
Executive Board and the Governing Council. Additionally, the need for
convergence has created some momentum for economic reform in peripheral
countries like Ireland, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Italy.i'Especially
the governors of the central banks have shown a firm commitment to price
stability. This provides some hope for the case that a large monetary union,
including the core group of countries belonging to the D-mark zone and the
countries which successfully converged to this group in recent years, will struggle
to convince international capital markets that the Euro will be a strong currency.34
V. LITERATURE
Collignon, Stefan (1994). Das europaische Wahrungssystem im Ubergang -
Erfahrungen mit dem EWS und politische Optionen, Wiesbaden.
Bean, Charles R. (1992). Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, The Journal
of Economic Perspectives 6 (4): 31-52.
European Monetary Institute (EMI) (1995). The Change over to the Single
Currency, Frankfurt/Main.
— (1996a). Annual Report 1995, Frankfurt/Main.
— (1996b). Progress Towards Convergence, Frankfurt/Main.
— (1997). Annual Report 1996, Frankfurt/Main.
DeGrauwe, Paul (1994). The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford.
European Commission (EC) (1995). Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements
for the Introduction of the Single Currency, Brussels.
— (1996). Statistical Annex of European Economy, Directorate for Economic
and Financial Affairs, Brussels.
Gros, Daniel, and Niels Thygesen (1992). European Monetary Integration,
London/New York.
Lehment, Harmen, and Joachim Scheide (1995). Der Fahrplan fur die
Europaische WShrung: Noch erheblicher Handlungs- und Klarungsbedarf.
Kiel Discussion Papers 259. Institute of World Economics, Kiel.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1996).
OECD Economic Outlook, Paris.
Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage (SVR)
(1995). Im Standortwettbewerb, Jahresgutachten 1995/96, Stuttgart.
Scheide, Joachim, and Ralph Solveen (1997a). Before EMU Starts: Economic
Policy Stimulates Recovery in Europe. Kiel Discussion Papers 294. Institute
of World Economics, Kiel.
— (1997b). Auf dem Weg zum Euro — Szenarien fur Zinsen, Wechselkurse und
Konjunktur. Kiel Discussion Papers 292. Institute of World Economics,
Kiel.Siebert, Horst (1997). Zu den Voraussetzungen der Europaischen
Wahrungsunion. Kiel Discussion Papers 289. Institute of World Economics,
Kiel.
Schweickert, Rainer (1996). Harmonisierung versus institutioneller Wettbewerb
zur Sicherung realwirtschaftlicher Anpassung und monetarer Stabilitat in der
Europaischen Wahrungsunion, Beihej'te der Konjunklurpolitik (44): 181-
212.
Walter, Christian (1993). Das Federal Reserve System, die Deutsche Bundesbank
und das Europaische System der Zentralbanken / die Europaische Zentral-
bank im Vergleich, Starnberg.
Willms, Manfred (1992). Internationale Wahrungspolitik, Miinchen.